Gravity centers as a weakest point
Introduction
The centers of gravity in their simplest conception are the weak point of a country or armed forces, it means that if we manage to cause or destroy it, we will have a greater possibility of achieving the objective of a war, victory.
In the same way, several scholars of the art of war indicate that the center of gravity is, “a source of physical or moral strength, which seriously degraded, dislocated, neutralized or destroyed could have the greatest decisive impact on the ability of the enemy orThe strength to fulfill the mission ”(Vego, 2008), also Clausewitz defined the center of gravity as the“ source of all power and movement, which everything depends ”(Clausewitz, 1999). Once the definitions and our own criteria are known, about the centers of gravity, we will focus on determining the center of gravity in the Gulf War.
Developing
The objective of the concept center of gravity is to focus planning and operations on what is extremely important. Suggests to forces, what should be protected and what to attack to achieve the goal. It is also not only necessary to identify the centers of gravity;It is also required to determine the vulnerabilities of these against which we can direct our military effort. The vulnerabilities of enemy centers of gravity will constitute the objectives against which we must concentrate our action, calling these as critical vulnerabilities.
During the Gulf War or better known as the Desert Storm, it was determined specifically by General Michael J Dugan, who was in charge of the United States Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, the centers of gravity,The same that would determine the achievement of the victory by the allies, commanded by the United States.
These centers of gravity were located in the part of Iraq, mainly and also in Kuwait. Recall that the war occurred because Iraq invaded Kuwait and demonstrated his superiority to a country that was not prepared for a war. In addition to the countries of the West and its allies had economic interests in this country.
The centers of gravity that were determined as primordial and that would determine the course of the war were: the Iraqi air defense system, the same as being destroyed or unusable, would allow allied troops to obtain aerial supremacy and give the approximate air supportTo troops on land, without any setbacks.
Another center of gravity was the destruction of aviation fields, so that Iraqi aircraft fail to decolar and do not become a threat to allied troops and their weapons systems. Because these tracks were totally or partially destroyed, most of the Iraqi aircraft were destroyed in their hangars without being able to take off.
The command and control centers would be another center of gravity that should be destroyed, so that they could not establish communications and link lines, in order to supply and provide logistics to their units. Additionally, another extremely important point and that deserved special attention was the destruction of the Iraqi armored ones, because due to the characteristics of the terrain they were very dangerous for troops on foot and who were advancing in order to consolidate Kuwait’s release and capture the captureof Sadam Husein.
For its part Iraq did not determine centers of gravity on the allied side in view of the fact that the environment and land would be favorable for its military campaign.
For its part, the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) did not have much to do before the start of hostilities, faced much higher air forces in all aspects, and the only thing they did conscientiously was to put their defense systemAntiarea, which understood a semi -centralized network that covered the entire country.
Conclusions
- When determining the centers of gravity clearly on the part of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I focus on their troops to achieve victory.
- The correct decision is based on the effective intelligence advice, which contained compliance with the mission.
- In order to determine the Iraqi gravity centers, the Chief of Staff, with the advice of his General Staff determined the operational objective that allowed to find the element of the fundamental design of the campaign.
Bibliography
- Vego, m. (2008). Theory and Practice. In m. Vego, Warfare Operational Joint (Page. 13). United States of America.
- Clausewitz, c. (1999). From the war. Madrid: Ministry of Defense of Spain.
- Araguena, c. (2016). Critical analysis of the strategic maneuver. Buenos Aires.
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